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Canada v. Khadr:
Reflections on the Use of
International Law in the
Repatriation Litigation
Jane M. Arbour*

I. INTRODUCTION
This paper was conceived to be an examination of the use of international law by the Supreme Court of Canada in its soon to be released
decision in the Omar Khadr repatriation litigation.1 The examination can
be brief as the Supreme Court made no more than passing reference to
international law in Khadr 2010 despite the decisions of the Federal
Court employing Canada’s obligations under international human rights
law as an aid in the interpretation of the scope of his section 7 Charter
rights. Nevertheless, the paper addresses in general terms the extraterritorial application of both the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms2
and international human rights law (“IHRL”) treaties to which Canada is
a party, using the differing approaches of the three levels of court in the
Omar Khadr repatriation litigation in determining the relevant principles
of fundamental justice as a backdrop to this discussion.
The discussion of extraterritorial application in this paper is limited
to questions of the application of the Charter and IHRL treaties to the
actions of Canadian officials that take place outside the territory of Canada. The removal of persons from Canada to alleged violations of human
rights in a foreign state and the impact of foreign events on the fairness

*
General Counsel, Department of Justice Canada. The views expressed in this paper are
the author’s and cannot be attributed to the Department of Justice or the Government of Canada.
This paper is current to April 14, 2010.
1
Canada (Prime Minister) v. Khadr, [2010] S.C.J. No. 3, 2010 SCC 3 (S.C.C.), revg in
part [2009] F.C.J. No. 893, 2009 FCA 246 (F.C.A.), which had affirmed [2009] F.C.J. No. 462, 2009
FC 405 (F.C.A.) [hereinafter “Khadr 2010”].
2
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
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of Canadian trials are two other types of fact situations in which questions of extraterritoriality arise, but these are not addressed here.
My first premise is that the Supreme Court of Canada, in limiting the
application of the Charter to the territory of Canada, with certain limited
exceptions, has taken an approach that is largely consistent with that of
international courts and tribunals, the courts of other states and general
academic commentary on the scope of state enforcement jurisdiction at
international law. Part II of the paper considers the Supreme Court’s decision in R. v. Hape3 in this light.
Part III of the paper posits that this approach to the extraterritorial
application of the Charter, based on general international law principles,
applies equally well to general questions of the extent of the extraterritorial reach of a state’s obligations under international human rights law
treaties. In outlining the considerations underlying this position, no attempt is made to canvass the wealth of materials that discuss the question
of whether IHRL treaties apply to the actions of states’ parties outside
their territory. Rather, several key sources will be referenced together
with some of the more recent decisions.
Part IV of the paper looks at implications of the analysis in Parts II
and III for the interpretation of the scope and reach of section 7 of the
Charter. The differing approaches to the principles of fundamental justice
taken by the two levels of the Federal Court and by the Supreme Court in
the Khadr repatriation litigation are the focus of this part of the paper.
The paper concludes with a number of general observations on the
implications of the limited scope of state enforcement jurisdiction for the
advancement of the international project for the protection of human
rights.

II. EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE CHARTER
In 2007, the Supreme Court of Canada, through the majority reasons
in Hape,4 set a new direction for the analysis of the potential application
of the Charter to the actions of Canadian officials outside of Canada. Relying on the foundational public international law principle of the
sovereign equality of all states and on the principles of non-intervention
and comity by which those states are called upon to respect each other’s
3

[2007] S.C.J. No. 26, 2007 SCC 26, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 292 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hape”].
Id., at paras. 1-122: Justice LeBel wrote the judgment of the majority. Justices Bastarache
and Binnie wrote separate sets of reasons.
4
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sovereignty, the Court tied the application of the Charter to its understanding of international rules governing the jurisdiction of states.
A number of commentators have rightfully noted that the word “jurisdiction” has a number of meanings even when restricted to matters of
state competence as understood at international law.5 State jurisdiction
can be broken down into various categories, including state authority to
make laws (legislative or prescriptive jurisdiction), to enforce those laws
(executive or enforcement jurisdiction) and to have issues determined by
domestic courts and tribunals (adjudicative jurisdiction).6 Turning to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Hape, it is clear that section 32(1) of the
Charter, which governs its application, is now to be read in a manner
consistent with the approach taken at international law to the jurisdiction
of states.7 In particular, whether the Charter applies to Canadian officials
conducting or participating in an investigation in a foreign state is now to
be determined in a manner consistent with enforcement jurisdiction at
international law.8
The Hape case dealt with the application of section 8 (search and seizure) of the Charter to the actions of Royal Canadian Mounted Police
(“RCMP”) officers in the Turks & Caicos Islands in furtherance of a Canadian criminal investigation. It is not entirely clear to what extent this
criminal law context affected the Court’s choice to rely on state enforcement jurisdiction for its analysis of the scope of extraterritorial
application of the Charter and, indeed, whether aspects of the Hape
analysis can be restricted to criminal investigation activities outside Canada. The Supreme Court appears to characterize the Charter as an
enforcement document:
The Cook approach therefore puts the focus in the wrong place, as it
involves looking for a conflict between concurrent jurisdictional
claims, whereas the question should instead be viewed as one of
extraterritorial enforcement of Canadian law. The issue in these cases
5

See generally F.A. Mann, The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law, Recueil Des
Cours 1964-I (Leyde: A.W. Sijthoff, 1964) [hereinafter “Mann”] and The Doctrine of International
Jurisdiction Revisited After Twenty Years, 186 Recueil Des Cours 1984-III (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985).
6
See generally I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 6th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) [hereinafter “Brownlie”], at 297ff (and references at note 1ff) on state
jurisdictional competencies. See also the Court’s discussion in Hape, supra, note 3, at paras. 57-65.
The Supreme Court makes reference to S. Coughlan et al., “Global Reach, Local Grasp: Constructing Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in the Age of Globalization” (2007) 6 C.J.L.T. 29 [hereinafter
“Coughlan et al.”].
7
Hape, supra, note 3: see, e.g., paras. 93, 94, 96, 104 and 113.
8
Id.: see in particular paras. 85, 87 and 105.
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is the applicability of the Charter to the activities of Canadian officers
conducting investigations abroad. The powers of prescription and
enforcement are both necessary to application of the Charter. The
Charter is prescriptive in that it sets out what the state and its agents
may and may not do in exercising the state’s powers. Prescription is not
in issue in the case at bar, but even so, the Charter cannot be applied if
compliance with its legal requirements cannot be enforced.
Enforcement of compliance with the Charter means that when state
agents act, they must do so in accordance with the requirements of the
Charter so as to give effect to Canadian law as it applies to the exercise
of the state power at issue. However, as has already been discussed,
Canadian law cannot be enforced in another state’s territory without
that state’s consent. Since extraterritorial enforcement is not possible,
and enforcement is necessary for the Charter to apply, extraterritorial
application of the Charter is impossible.9

In Hape, the Supreme Court recognized that the power, authority,
competence or “jurisdiction” of states to enforce their laws outside of
their own territory, at international law, is quite limited.10 As noted in the
introduction, my starting premise is that this aspect of the Supreme
Court’s approach to the extraterritorial application of the Charter is
largely consistent with general international law principles governing the
exercise of state enforcement authority outside its territory.
Generally speaking, state enforcement jurisdiction is largely territorial in scope with certain limited exceptions.11 A state may exercise
authority (enforce its laws) in the territory of a foreign state only with the
consent, acquiescence or approval of that foreign state. Other exceptional
circumstances in which international law recognizes some extraterritorial
exercise of state enforcement authority include foreign territory under
military occupation, the territorial sea, embassies and consular offices as
well as ships and aircraft registered in or flying the flag of the state.12 It

9

Id., at para. 85 (emphasis added).
Id., at para. 65.
11
Id. The Supreme Court of Canada, in Hape, referenced a number of academic sources,
including I. Brownlie, supra, note 6, and Mann, supra, note 5, as well as Case of the S.S. “Lotus”
(1927) P.C.I.J. Ser. A, No. 10 and Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and
Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), [1986] I.C.J. Rep. 14.
12
Brownlie, supra, note 6, at 113:
... the equation of territory and jurisdiction is theoretically sound. Abstract discussion as
to whether ships, aircraft, territorial sea, and embassies are “territory” lacks reality, since
in a legal context the word denotes a particular sphere of legal competence and not a geographical concept. Ultimately territory cannot be distinguished from jurisdiction for
certain purposes. Both terms refer to legal powers, and, when a concentration of such
10
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may be noted that, apart from consent, each category of exception arises
within a different context and the principles governing the appropriate
exercise of extraterritorial state jurisdiction derive from the laws and
principles governing the relevant context.13
In Hape, the Court primarily addressed the issue of whether the
Turks and Caicos could be said to have consented to the exercise of Canadian law on its territory such that a Canadian warrant for aspects of the
criminal investigation would apply on its territory. No such consent was
found and the Charter was held not to govern the actions of the RCMP in
the Turks and Caicos in the circumstances of that investigation. While
consent was the main consideration on the facts, the majority recognized
other exceptions that exist at international law.14
Where the Supreme Court differs from these general international
principles is in its recognition of a further, or exceptional exception based
on participation by Canadian officials in activities of a foreign state
where those foreign activities violate fundamental human rights.15 It appears that the Supreme Court views comity as a discretionary rule
affecting the scope of state jurisdiction such that states, or at least the
courts of a state, may disregard the sovereignty of a foreign state which
is engaged in violations of fundamental human rights. While much can
be said about the Court’s decision to retain a seemingly discretionary
power to apply the Charter when it would not otherwise apply according
to general international law principles regarding enforcement jurisdiction, this is not the focus of the paper.

powers occurs, the analogy with territorial sovereignty justifies the use of the term “territory” as a form of shorthand.
13
For example, the exception relating to military occupation of foreign territory is governed
by international rules related to armed conflict. In determining whether or not the Charter applied to
the actions of the Canadian Forces in detaining individuals in Afghanistan, the Federal Court, applying Hape, concluded that the Charter did not apply given that Canada was not an occupying power in
any part of Afghanistan in the relevant timeframe and could not be said to be exercising enforcement
jurisdiction over Afghan detainees: Amnesty International Canada v. Canada (Canadian Forces),
[2008] F.C.J. No. 356 (F.C.A.), affd [2008] F.C.J. No. 1700, 2008 FCA 401, [2009] 4 F.C.R. 149
(F.C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2009] S.C.C.A. No. 63 (S.C.C.).
14
Hape, supra, note 3, at paras. 65 and 105.
15
Id., at para. 101.
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III. EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES
Much has been written about the extent of the application of international human rights law treaties beyond the territory of the states that are
party to them. In the past 10 years, many articles have addressed and attempted to reconcile the jurisprudence of, among others, the International
Court of Justice (“ICJ”), the European Court of Human Rights, the British House of Lords and the American Supreme Court speaking on the
issue of the extraterritorial reach of legislative, constitutional or international human rights obligations.16
From the brief survey that follows, it will be clear that I am of the
view that most of the jurisprudence to date is consistent, at least in its
result, with the general approach of the limited extraterritorial reach of
state enforcement jurisdiction at international law. This view underscores
my second premise, that public international law suggests a limited application of a state’s obligations under IHRL treaties to the actions of its
officials outside of its territory, as a general rule. There may, of course,
be exceptions to this general proposition, exceptions which may be set
out expressly in the text of particular treaty provisions or which can be
implied through an interpretation based on the purpose of the particular
right.17 Note also that this discussion of the limited extraterritorial reach
of the IHRL treaties does not encompass peremptory norms of international law.
In short, treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,18 which make general reference to state parties’ obligations

16

See, e.g., the various papers in F. Coomans & M.T. Kamminga, eds., Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (Antwerp-Oxford: Intersentia, 2004), as well as P.C. Cernadas,
“European Migration Control in the African Territory: The Omission of the Extraterritorial Character of Human Rights Obligations” (2009) 10 Inter. J.H.R. 179; Coughlan et al., supra, note 6; M.
Gondek, “Extraterritorial Application of the European Convention on Human Rights: Territorial
Application in the Age of Globalization?” (2005) Nethl. Int’l L. Rev. 349; S. Miller, “Revisiting
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: A Territorial Justification for Extraterritorial Jurisdiction under the
European Convention” (2009) 20 E.J.I.L. 122.
17
An example of a specific right that necessarily has extraterritorial application can be
found in El Ghar v. Libya, CCPR/C/82/D/1107/2002, a decision of the U.N. Human Rights Committee (November 15, 2004). This case discusses the obligation of a state party to the Covenant, under
art. 12.2, to provide citizens outside its territory the documents necessary to allow the citizen to enter
the state (a passport case).
18
U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2200 A (XXI) (December 16, 1966). Canada acceded
on May 19, 1976.
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to individuals based on “territory” and/or “jurisdiction”,19 or which remain silent on the general scope of state obligation, should be read in
light of general international law rules of state jurisdiction. Further, when
one takes into account the often touted formula that states are obligated
under international human rights treaties to respect, protect and promote20 the human rights set out in those treaties to which they are a party,
it can perhaps be more easily understood why states might object to being told they must protect the human rights of individuals in territories
over which they lack the effective jurisdiction at international law to do
so.
What follows is a brief mention of some decisions of the International Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights, as well
as some commentary from the United Nations Human Rights Committee
and the United Nations Committee Against Torture.
1. The International Court of Justice
The International Court of Justice discussed the question of the application of the IHRL treaty obligations of the State of Israel in respect of
its actions in the Palestine territory in the Wall case.21 The case was
premised on the fact of Israeli military occupation of the territory in
question. It is not surprising therefore that the ICJ held that Israel’s IHRL
treaty obligations applied. The case is more often cited for the Court’s
discussion of the relationship between IHRL and international humanitarian law.
A year later, the ICJ again found the application of IHRL treaty obligations of Uganda applied outside its territory on the basis of its effective
military occupation of parts of the territory of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo.22 This case also discusses gross violations of international
humanitarian law.

19
Article 2.1 of the ICCPR reads, in part, “Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the
rights recognized …”.
20
See generally the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action adopted by the World
Conference on Human Rights (June 25, 1993). See also various General Comments by U.N. human
rights treaty bodies.
21
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, at 136. See, in conclusion on IHRL treaties, paras. 111-113.
22
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v.
Uganda), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, at 168. See, e.g., para. 211.
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2. United Nations Treaty Bodies
The Human Rights Committee has set out its interpretation of the
scope of states parties’ obligations under article 2 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in its General Comment No. 31.23
Paragraph 10 of this general comment is often cited to support the view
that a state party’s obligations under the Covenant apply wherever the
state has effective control over persons outside its territory. Paragraph 10
reads in part:
States Parties are required by article 2, paragraph 1, to respect and to
ensure the Covenant rights to all persons who may be within their
territory and to all persons subject to their jurisdiction. This means that
a State party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the
Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control of that State
Party, even if not situated within the territory of the State Party ... This
principle also applies to those within the power or effective control of
the forces of a State Party acting outside its territory, regardless of the
circumstances in which such power or effective control was obtained,
such as forces constituting a national contingent of a State Party
assigned to an international peace-keeping or peace-enforcement
operation.

It is unclear whether this paragraph asserts that Covenant obligations
apply in all cases where state officials exercise effective control over a
person outside the jurisdiction of the state or to all persons within the
jurisdiction of the state outside its territory.24 To the extent that this General Comment asserts the former, it arguably is inconsistent with public
international law principles governing the scope of extraterritorial state
enforcement jurisdiction. However, the General Comment is not clear
and the Committee cites no authorities for this assertion.
The general comments of United Nations treaty bodies are not legally binding documents25 and, to the extent that aspects of them are not
derived from the text of the treaty in question, from the views of the
23
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, General Comment No. 31: Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant (May 26, 2004).
24
The distinction between effective control over persons outside both the territory and the
jurisdiction of a state and the control of a state over persons within its jurisdiction — where that
jurisdiction lies outside the territory of the state — was important, for example, in the resolution of
the Canadian Afghan detainees litigation: supra, note 13. See the discussion of international and
comparative law sources by Mactavish J. at paras. 187-266.
25
See, e.g., the decision of Mactavish J. in the Afghan detainees litigation, supra, note 13,
at para. 239.
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treaty body under its individual complaint mechanism or from case law,
their interpretive value is questionable. I am only aware of one more recent communication in which the Committee discusses the application of
the Covenant to state actions outside its territory. No mention is made of
General Comment 31 in the Committee’s consideration of the merits of
this complaint.
In Munaf v. Romania,26 the Human Rights Committee considered the
communication of an Iraqi-American dual national against Romania in
which it was alleged that Romania violated its obligations under the
Covenant in Iraq for failing to intervene on behalf of the author with
Iraqi officials. The facts are complicated but two relevant factual elements are that the author passed through the Romanian Embassy in Iraq
before being turned over by the Multinational Force — Iraq (“MNF-I”)
to the Iraqi government and Romania was participating in MNF-I at the
time but its forces did not participate in the detention or transfer of the
author. In its views on the merits, the Committee did not discuss whether
Romania could be said to have had effective control over the person of
Mr. Munaf even though it was argued. It appears that Romania did not
have that control. Furthermore, the Committee did not discuss the relevance of Romanian participation in MNF-I. Rather, the Committee seems
to have based its views on the presence of Mr. Munaf in the Embassy.
The Committee relied on some of its jurisprudence dealing with state
removal to serious violations of human rights in another state and found
that the facts did not establish foreseeability of future harm by Iraq on
the part of the Romanian officials at the time Mr. Munaf left the Embassy. Interestingly, the Committee concluded that it “cannot find that the
State party exercised jurisdiction over the author in a way that exposed
him to a real risk of becoming a victim of any violations under the Covenant”.27
The Committee Against Torture (“CAT”) has set out its interpretation
of the obligations of states’ parties to the Convention Against Torture and
Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment28 in its General
Comment No. 229 on article 2.30 Paragraph 16 outlines the CAT Commit26

CCPR/C/96/D/1539/2006 (August 21, 2009). Note: two sets of dissenting views were

written.
27

Id., at para. 14.6.
U.N. General Assembly Resolution 39/46 (December 10, 1984). Canada ratified the CAT
on June 24, 1987.
29
CAT/C/GC/2, General Comment No. 2: Implementation of article 2 by States parties
(January 24, 2008).
28
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tee’s understanding of the phrase “any territory under its jurisdiction” in
article 2.1. This paragraph states in part:
… The Committee has recognized that “any territory” includes all areas
where the State party exercises, directly or indirectly, in whole or in
part, de jure or de facto effective control, in accordance with
international law. The reference to “any territory” in article 2 … refers
to prohibited acts committed not only on board a ship or aircraft
registered by a State party, but also during military occupation or
peacekeeping operations and in such places as embassies, military
bases, detention facilities, or other areas over which a State exercises
factual or effective control … The Committee considers that the scope
of “territory” under article 2 must also include situations where a State
party exercises, directly or indirectly, de facto or de jure control over
persons in detention.

It will be seen from this that the CAT Committee’s discussion of jurisdiction is fairly close to what has been described in this paper as the
approach of general public international law,31 but arguably takes a
broader approach in certain respects, such as its references to peacekeeping operations in juxtaposition with military occupation and to the “de
facto control of persons in detention” without additional explanation.
The CAT Committee provides no sources for its interpretive approach, beyond references to various articles of the CAT. It is doubtful
whether the Committee has had many, if any, occasions in the course of
deliberating on individual communications to actually consider jurisdiction in light of specific fact situations.
3. The European Court of Human Rights
The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights on questions of the extraterritorial application of the European Convention on
Human Rights32 (“ECHR”) is extensive and growing. The leading case is
Bankovic.33 This decision of the Grand Chamber clearly states that the
obligations of a state party to the European Convention are generally
30
Article 2.1 of the CAT reads: “Each State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction.”
31
See also M. Nowak & E. McArthur, The United Nations Convention Against Torture: A
Commentary (Oxford: University Press, 2008), at 116-17, in particular, on the meaning to ascribe to
the words “any territory under its jurisdiction” in article 2 of the CAT.
32
Canada is not a party to this regional instrument.
33
Bankovic and Others v. Belgium and 16 Other Contracting States, [GC] ECHR No.
52207/99, ECHR 2001-XII.
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speaking limited to the territory of the state. The exceptions to this rule
include the consent of a state to the exercise on its territory of jurisdiction by a state party to the ECHR, military occupation of foreign territory
and other exceptions recognized at international law.34
Two more recent decisions of the European Court examining the
question of extraterritoriality are of interest.
In the Case of Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi,35 the Fourth Section of the
European Court addressed the scope of the ECHR obligations of the
United Kingdom in respect of two individuals detained by its military
forces in Iraq. The European Court held that article 3 of the European
Convention applied to the transfer by U.K. forces of two individuals in
Iraq for prosecution and therefore to a risk of the imposition of the death
penalty by Iraq. It appears that the basis for the extraterritorial application of the Convention in this case was the fact that both Al-Saadoon and
Mufdhi had been captured and detained by the U.K. military forces in
2003, during the period of U.K. military occupation of parts of Iraq,36
and remained in U.K. custody until they were transferred to Iraq in 2008.
As noted above, military occupation of foreign territory is one of those
exceptions in which states are found to exercise extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction. This decision can be seen as an example of both the
military occupation exception and the application of the idea of a continuity of action to which obligations will attach. In this case, although the
military occupation ceased before transfer, the U.K. obligations to protect
the human rights of persons in that occupied territory extended beyond
the end of the occupation to apply to U.K. actions to extricate itself from
obligations which arose at that earlier period in time.
In the Case of Medvedyev and Others,37 the Grand Chamber of the
European Court had occasion to consider the application of the European
Convention to the interception by a French naval vessel of a ship registered in Cambodia. The ship, which was thought to be engaged in drug
trafficking, was intercepted by France on the high seas. At issue was
whether France had violated the rights of the individuals on board to be

34

Id. See, e.g., para. 71.
Case of Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights,
Application No. 61498/08, decision of the Fourth Section (March 2, 2010). A request for referral to
the Grand Chamber is pending.
36
Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi, id. The significant timing is set out at paras. 129-130.
37
Case of Medvedyev and Others v. France, European Court of Human Rights, Application
no. 3394/03, decision of the Grand Chamber (March 29, 2010).
35
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brought promptly before a judicial officer upon detention given that it
had taken some 13 days to bring their ship into a French port.
Noting the “essentially territorial notion of jurisdiction” and that in
“specific situations, customary international law and treaty provisions
have clearly recognized and defined the extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction by the relevant State”, the Court based its application of the
Convention on the fact that French officials “exercised full and exclusive
control” over the intercepted ship and its crew “at least de facto, from the
time of its interception, in a continuous and uninterrupted manner” until
they were charged and tried in France.38
The approach of the European Court in Medvedyev is interesting in
several ways. Readers will note its affirmation of its approach in Bankovic and other earlier decisions. In addition, the Court chose not to rely
on the fact that France had the consent of Cambodia to intercept and
board the vessel, preferring instead to assess the facts as one continuous
event which resolved itself within French territory. In my view, the
threads of this analytical approach can be seen in a number of treaty
body decisions regarding states that have taken control illegally of individuals outside their territory and brought them forcibly within their
territory.39
The cases highlighted in this part of the paper focus on extraterritorial exercises of state jurisdiction based on some measure of state control
over territory or place and not just over persons. As I hope has been
made apparent, effective state control over persons outside the territory
of the state is an alternate and more expansive approach to the scope of
extraterritorial state enforcement jurisdiction. The litigation involving
Omar Khadr, which is discussed in Part IV, does not raise the issue of
effective control over the person as Canada had no such control over the
person of Omar Khadr.

IV. THE REPATRIATION LITIGATION
The question of the extraterritorial reach of Canada’s IHRL obligations has some relevance to the Supreme Court of Canada’s recent

38

Id. The Court’s discussion of the jurisdiction of France for the purposes of Article 1 of
the Convention is found at paras. 62-67.
39
One example from the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights is Öcalan
v. Turkey (2005), 41 EHRR 985; ECHR No. 46221/99, although extraterritorial jurisdiction could
also be rooted in the acceptance or acquiescence of officials of the Kenyan government.
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decision in Khadr 2010.40 As already noted, the genesis for this paper
was anticipation of a discussion of international human rights law by the
Supreme Court in Khadr 2010 given the approach taken at the Federal
Court in referencing IHRL in its analysis of the principles of fundamental
justice under section 7 of the Charter. As the Supreme Court did not discuss international law in its decision, this paper is left to observe that
there was no take-up of the Federal Court approach and to discuss why
that matters.
The decision of the Supreme Court in Khadr 2010 has its origins in
the judicial review application brought by Omar Khadr to challenge the
Canadian government’s refusal to seek his repatriation from the government of the United States. This application for judicial review followed
the disclosure of information ordered by the Supreme Court in its 2008
decision. The disclosed information revealed that the last interview of
Mr. Khadr by Canadian officials, in March 2004, was conducted by an
official of the Department of Foreign Affairs who had been told, just
prior to the interview, that American officials had subjected Mr. Khadr to
a program of sleep deprivation in order to prepare him.41
At this point, it is useful to recall that in Khadr 2008,42 the Supreme
Court applied the Charter to the actions of Canadian officials interviewing Omar Khadr, a Canadian youth, in U.S. detention in Guantánamo
Bay. The Court relied on decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court to find that
the U.S. detention of Omar Khadr during the period of the Canadian interviews was contrary to U.S. law and to fundamental international
human rights law. The Charter was found to apply to the extraterritorial
actions of the Canadian officials because through their actions, the Canadian government participated in the U.S. violations of Mr. Khadr’s rights:

40

Supra, note 1.
See Khadr v. Canada (Attorney General), [2008] F.C.J. No. 972, 2008 FC 807, 331
F.T.R. 1 (F.C.). Justice Mosley, the Federal Court judge tasked with applying the decision of the
Supreme Court in Khadr 2008, infra, note 42, ordered the full disclosure of the report of the March
2004 interview which had been written by the DFAIT official. The Canadian government had released almost the entire report but sought to protect the paragraph containing the information
provided in confidence by a U.S. official as well as a “side comment by the DFAIT official” (at para.
85). As the interrogation techniques used at Guantánamo Bay at the time were in a recent and public
report of the U.S. government, as the techniques were considered to be cruel and inhuman treatment,
and as Canada was “implicated in the violation when the DFAIT official was provided with the
redacted information and chose to proceed with the interview”, Mosley J. ordered the government to
remove the redactions: id., at paras. 85-89.
42
Canada (Justice) v. Khadr, [2008] S.C.J. No. 28, 2008 SCC 28, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 125
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Khadr 2008”].
41

288

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2010), 51 S.C.L.R. (2d)

We conclude that the principles of international law and comity that
might otherwise preclude application of the Charter to Canadian
officials acting abroad do not apply to the assistance they gave to U.S.
authorities at Guantanamo Bay. Given the holdings of the United States
Supreme Court, the Hape comity concerns that would ordinarily justify
deference to foreign law have no application here. The effect of the
United States Supreme Court’s holdings is that the conditions under
which Mr. Khadr was held and was liable for prosecution were illegal
under both U.S. and international law at the time Canadian officials
interviewed Mr. Khadr and gave the information to U.S. authorities.
Hence no question of deference to foreign law arises. The Charter
bound Canada to the extent that the conduct of Canadian officials
involved it in a process that violated Canada’s international
43
obligations.

While there may be several ways to characterize what the Supreme
Court meant when it held that the Charter applied to the actions of Canadian officials, in my view the Court founded the application of the
Charter on Canadian participation in the activities of a foreign state that
violated international human rights law that Canada itself was bound to
respect. As the United States was violating international law, the Canadian courts owed no deference and could apply the Charter directly to the
actions of the Canadian officials outside Canada in this situation. Arguably, the Court did not find or even consider that Canada’s international
human rights obligations applied in Guantánamo Bay. Rather, the Court
seems to have been saying that if Canadian officials outside Canada take
part in foreign state violations of international human rights, which parenthetically Canada is obligated to respect in Canada, then the Charter
may apply.44
In Khadr 2010, the Supreme Court relied on its 2008 decision45 to
support the extraterritorial application of the Charter. The new twist in
the repatriation litigation comes in the analysis under section 7 of the
Charter. At the first stage of the section 7 analysis, the Court explained
that the liberty interest of Omar Khadr was engaged on the basis of its
assumption that the information shared with the U.S. government as a
consequence of the Canadian interviews was contributing to his continuing detention.46
43

Id., at para. 26.
Note that this approach seems consistent with the concepts of state responsibility at international law.
45
Khadr 2008, supra, note 42, at para. 18.
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Khadr 2010, supra, note 1, at para. 21.
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In order to constitute a violation of section 7 rights, however, the contribution to the continued detention of Omar Khadr had to be determined
to be contrary to principles of fundamental justice as those are understood
in Canada. As the Supreme Court noted, and this part of the discussion
attempts to describe, the three levels of court took three different approaches to the quest for the applicable principles of fundamental justice.
At first instance,47 O’Reilly J. stated four main issues to be resolved
in the application. Of particular interest to this discussion is the third
issue: “Does the Canadian Government have a legal duty to protect Mr.
Khadr?”48 The Court had first to determine whether the application was
res judicata and whether there was any “decision” of the government that
properly could be the subject of judicial review. The final issue was one
of determining the appropriate remedy.
In order to determine whether the refusal to seek his repatriation was
a subject for judicial review, O’Reilly J. canvassed some recent decisions
of the courts of the United Kingdom49 as well as Hicks v. Ruddock,50 a
decision of the Federal Court of Australia, and Kaunda v. President of
South Africa,51 a decision of the Constitutional Court of South Africa.
Justice O’Reilly concluded that the cases did not identify any clear duty
on the part of these states, under either international law or the common
law, to protect their nationals held in detention by foreign states. That
conclusion, however, did not help him determine what duties, if any, are
owed by the Canadian government “to citizens whose constitutional
rights … are engaged”.52
Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Khadr 2008, O’Reilly J.
held that the Charter applied to the actions of the Canadian officials in
interviewing Mr. Khadr and that his liberty interest was engaged. Justice
O’Reilly situated his analysis of whether there existed a Charter duty to
protect Mr. Khadr at the second stage of the section 7 analysis. Three
international human rights treaties, to which Canada is party, were cited
in this part of his analysis: the Convention Against Torture and Other

47

[2009] F.C.J. No. 462, 2009 FC 405 (F.C.A.).
Id., at para. 4.
49
Abbasi v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, [2002] E.W.J. No.
4947 (C.A.); Al Rawi, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, [2006] EWCA Civ
1279 and Mohamed v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, [2008] EWHC
2048 (Admin).
50
[2007] FCA (Australia) 299.
51
CCT 23/04.
52
Supra, note 47, at para. 47.
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Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”),53 the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”)54 and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of
children in armed conflict (“OP CRC Armed Conflict”).55
Justice O’Reilly’s analysis of the scope of Canada’s obligations
under the CRC contributed significantly to his conclusion that the
substantive principles of fundamental justice impose a duty on the Canadian government “to protect persons in Mr. Khadr’s circumstances”.56 In
the outlining of the obligations to which Canada is bound as a party to
the CRC, there is no discussion of whether or why these obligations apply to young persons outside Canadian territory and, perhaps more
pointedly, no discussion of the extraterritorial extent of the effective jurisdiction of Canada.
There is no doubt that obligations to protect children from the circumstances faced by Omar Khadr are IHRL duties of the Canadian
government in respect of children and youth in Canada. But, it is submitted, there is in reality no way for the Canadian government to actually
protect the rights of anyone within the territory or jurisdiction of the
United States.
As noted in Part III, state parties to international human rights treaties are said to be obligated to respect, protect and promote the human
rights set out in the relevant treaty. An examination of the situation of
Omar Khadr raises all three categories of obligations. One sentence from
O’Reilly J.’s decision can be used to highlight all three:
In Mr. Khadr’s case, while Canada did make representations regarding
his possible mistreatment, it also participated directly in conduct that
failed to respect Mr. Khadr’s rights, and failed to take steps to remove
him from an extended period of unlawful detention among adult
57
prisoners, without contact with his family.

In real terms, the rules and realities of state jurisdiction at international law are no impediment to Canadian officials respecting the rights
of individuals outside Canada. However, while Canada may request, and
thereby try to promote, foreign state respect for the rights of others
53

Supra, note 28.
General Assembly resolution 44/25 (November 20, 1989); Canada ratified the CRC on
December 13, 1991.
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General Assembly resolution 54/263 (May 25, 2000); Canada ratified the OP CRC
Armed Conflict on July 7, 2000.
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within the jurisdiction of the foreign state, Canada cannot itself effectively protect those rights. Short of the use of force, no state can stop
another state that is engaged in the violation of the rights of individuals
within its territory or subject to its effective jurisdiction. Canada can ask
that Mr. Khadr receive certain types of treatment, as it has done,58 and it
could seek the repatriation of Mr. Khadr, which it has declined doing, but
it cannot “remove him from an extended period of unlawful detention” in
the United States. In short, the duties or obligations to protect under the
CRC cannot be said to extend outside the territory or effective jurisdiction of states.
While the decision at first instance appears to ground a duty to protect individuals outside Canada, at least those who might find themselves
in situations similar to Omar Khadr, on an extraterritorial application of
international human rights treaty obligations, a government request for
his repatriation was held to be the extent of government action required
to comply with the duty.59 With respect, the duty found by O’Reilly J.
perhaps could be reformulated as either “a duty to take steps to encourage a foreign State to respect human rights” or “a duty to take steps to try
to protect”.
At the Federal Court of Appeal,60 the question of whether the government violated the section 7 rights of Omar Khadr was more closely
focused on the implications of a Canadian official proceeding with the
March 2004 interview with knowledge that Omar Khadr had been subjected to inhumane treatment by U.S. officials.
The majority, made up of Evans and Sharlow JJ.A., did not address
directly whether O’Reilly J. had erred in finding a duty to protect. They
relied instead on the proposition that “questioning a prisoner to obtain
information after he has been subjected to cruel and abusive treatment to
induce him to talk does not accord with the principles of fundamental
justice”.61 To support their stated principle of fundamental justice, the
majority cited section 269.1 of the Criminal Code62 as well as the CAT
and the CRC, both of which prohibit subjecting individuals to inhumane
treatment. Canada’s ratification of the Convention Against Torture was
58
[2009] F.C.J. No. 893, 2009 FCA 246 (F.C.A.). See the dissenting reasons of Nadon J.A.,
at para. 88, in which he reproduces several paragraphs of the factum filed on behalf of the Attorney
General of Canada.
59
Supra, note 47, at para. 92.
60
Supra, note 58.
61
Id., at paras. 50 and 54.
62
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
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found to clearly demonstrate its “acceptance of the general prohibition on
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment as a principle of fundamental justice”.63 Canadian officials were found to have acted inconsistently with
this principle of fundamental justice because they knew about the foreign
abuse and “sought to take advantage of it”.64 The closest the Federal
Court of Appeal gets to a discussion of any duty to protect persons
outside Canada is to state that “Canada had an obligation in the unusual
circumstances of this case to request Mr. Khadr’s repatriation”.65
In his dissenting reasons, Nadon J.A. took issue with the finding of a
duty to protect at first instance. He pointed out that O’Reilly J. failed to
take into account the limited ability of Canada to protect Omar Khadr
and did not address the question of extraterritoriality:
… nowhere in his Reasons does the Judge consider the steps taken by
Canada, nor does he, in my respectful opinion, consider the context of
Mr. Khadr’s detention and the extent to which Canada’s ability to
protect him was limited. More particularly, in imposing obligations on
Canada, on the basis of international instruments to which Canada is a
party, O’Reilly J. failed to recognize the territorial limitation of these
66
instruments.

The reasons of the Supreme Court on the question of the applicable
principles of fundamental justice take a slightly different tack from either
level of the Federal Court. While the judgment of the Supreme Court
takes up a listing of the various aspects of the difficult circumstances in
which Omar Khadr finds himself and to Canadian contributions to that
situation in the course of its interviews,67 there is no mention of either a
duty to protect or any of Canada’s international human rights treaty obligations.68 The Court states that the conduct of the Canadian officials
“establishes Canadian participation in state conduct that violates the
principles of fundamental justice” and goes on to state the relevant principle as follows:
63

Supra, note 58, at para. 52.
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Id., at para. 95.
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Compare O’Reilly J.’s reasons, id., at para. 70, with the Supreme Court’s decision, supra,
note 1, at paras. 24 and 30.
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Interrogation of a youth, to elicit statements about the most serious
criminal charges while detained in these conditions and without access
to counsel, and while knowing that the fruits of the interrogations
would be shared with the U.S. prosecutors, offends the most basic
69
Canadian standards about the treatment of detained youth suspects.

It is again difficult to be certain of the exact analytical approach of
the Supreme Court. In my view, the Court appears to be indicating that
interrogation in these circumstances in Canada would be inconsistent
with the principles of fundamental justice and, where the Charter is
found to apply to extraterritorial actions of Canadian officials, such interrogations may violate section 7. That is, the approach is one of “if you
could not do it in Canada (in terms of the principles of fundamental justice), it will be a violation of the Charter to act in this way outside
Canada too, if the Charter applies”.
Again, much could be said about the implications of this approach, if
it is indeed what the Supreme Court means by its decision. For the purposes of this paper, it is sufficient to observe that the Supreme Court’s
analysis did not require it to either find or imply an extraterritorial reach
for Canada’s IHRL obligations. That is, the approach taken by the Supreme Court in Khadr 2010 is not inconsistent with the implications of
its Hape analysis and of the application of the scope of state enforcement
jurisdiction at international law to questions of the extraterritorial reach
of IHRL.
It should be noted that the Court, nevertheless, could have used the
domestic scope of Canada’s IHRL obligations to inform the principle of
fundamental justice it stated in Khadr 2010. It appears that the Court had
no need to call on IHRL obligations to assist it in identifying the applicable Canadian principles of fundamental justice governing interrogations.

V. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
This discussion has attempted, admittedly in an abbreviated way, to
explain the general rules of public international law addressing the extraterritorial scope of state enforcement jurisdiction and the relationship
between the extraterritorial reach of international human rights treaties
and the Supreme Court of Canada’s approach to the extraterritorial
application of the Charter.
69
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I am very aware that the paper may read as a general apology for violations of human rights by states outside their territories. But this it most
certainly is not. The fact that a state’s international human rights treaty obligations may not apply to all state actions outside its territory does not
mean that a state or its officials can act with impunity. Some violations of
human rights will be violations of jus cogens or of international humanitarian law, which do not have the same territorial limitations. Some
extraterritorial actions will attract criminal law consequences within the
state in question, within other states that take extended criminal jurisdiction over the acts in question, or even at international criminal law in the
case of the most serious forms of human rights violations. Moreover, states
are responsible, in certain circumstances, where they participate in violations of another state’s international human rights law obligations.
So, is this paper merely a discussion of a distinction without a difference? In my view, it is not. International human rights law treaties set out
legally binding obligations for states parties. The understandable desire
to read an expansive extraterritorial reach into IHRL treaties requires, in
my view, an interpretative approach that takes IHRL outside the greater
body of international law. This approach, in my view, risks furthering the
tendency of some states and of some lawyers within all states to view
international law, and in particular human rights law, as incapable of creating binding obligations — as not, in fact, law. An interpretive approach
that suggests that IHRL treaties are hortatory documents setting out
ideals that can be adapted and expanded as required to fit new contingencies risks debasing the importance of these treaties and the obligations of
states under them.
The United Nations system for the protection of human rights is a
project which is still ongoing. There remain gaps in protection and in
state accountability that need to be addressed and, if possible, filled. In
this era of a seemingly interminable global struggle against terrorism, it
is important to take a hard look at what law is in place and what law still
needs to be written.
This paper, then, is a plea for careful scholarship on the extent of international human rights law treaty obligations both at international law
and in Canadian law as Canadian courts look to Canada’s IHRL obligations to assist them in the interpretation of Canadian statutes and the
Charter.

